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Abstract
One index satisfies the duality axiom if one agent, who is uniformly more risk-averse than
another, accepts a gamble, the latter accepts any less risky gamble under the index. Aumann
and Serrano (2008) show that only one index defined for so-called gambles satisfies the duality
and positive homogeneity axioms. We call it a duality index. This paper extends the definition of
duality index to all outcomes including all gambles, and considers a portfolio selection problem
in a complete market, in which the agent’s target is to minimize the index of the utility of
the relative investment outcome. By linking this problem to a series of Merton’s optimum
consumption-like problems, the optimal solution is explicitly derived. It is shown that if the
prior benchmark level is too high (which can be verified), then the investment risk will be beyond
any agent’s risk tolerance. If the benchmark level is reasonable, then the optimal solution will be
the same as that of one of the Merton’s series problems, but with a particular value of absolute
risk aversion, which is given by an explicit algebraic equation as a part of the optimal solution.
According to our result, it is riskier to achieve the same surplus profit in a stable market than
in a less-stable market, which is consistent with the common financial intuition.
Keywords: Duality Axiom, Duality Risk Measure, Duality Index, Portfolio Selection
1 Introduction
Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) point out that whether or not a person takes a gamble depends on two
distinct considerations:
(i) The attributes of the gamble and, in particular, how risky it is; and
(ii) The attributes of the person and, in particular, how averse he or she is to risk.
In terms of the first issue, the concept of the risk measure has been used to explain how risky a
gamble is. Many well-studied risk measures are described in the literature, such as the superhedging
price, value at risk, tail value at risk, and expected shortfall as well as general coherent risk measures.
These measures emphasize certain aspects of risk. However, few of them directly reflect the risk-
averse person’s attitude; that is, the perspective that “risk is what risk-averters hate” (Machina and
Rothschild 2008). The entropic risk measure, which depends on such a risk aversion through the
exponential utility function, is one of the few to have attempted to capture this feature. In order to
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kind referring of the celebrated work of Aumann and Serrano (2008). This author acknowledges financial support
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overcome the drawbacks of the existing measures, Aumann and Serrano (2008) have developed one
risk measure which emphasizes such a risk-averters’ attitude. This preserves many properties of the
coherent risk measure such as first-order monotonicity, convexity and positive homogeneity. Unlike
the coherent risk measure, however, it is also second-order monotonic, which is consistent with the
emphasis on the risk-averters’ attitude. Unfortunately, Aumann and Serrano (2008) only define the
measure for a certain type of discrete random variables called gambles. It is acknowledged that
most outcomes in financial applications are of continuous or mixed type, so their measure cannot
be applied to many of theses outcomes. To incorporate general outcomes such as price of stocks,
options and general contingent claims, this paper generalizes the definition of the measure to cover
all random variables. The measure, like the original, will satisfy an essential axiom, namely the
duality axiom. This axiom states that if one agent, who is uniformly more risk-averse than another
agent, accepts a gamble, the latter will accept any less-risky gamble under the measure. It clearly
demonstrates the solid connection between the measure and the attitude of the risk-averter. We
therefore label it as the duality risk measure or duality index. The axiomatic characterization of
the measure will be considered in detail in the following section.
In terms of the second consideration, utility functions have been used to describe the risk-aversion
of an agent. The most widely used utility functions are concave, which represents that the agent
is globally risk-averse. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992) consider S-shaped utility functions1 to
reflect the risk-seeking attitude of the agent in a loss situation and the risk-averse attitude in a gain
situation. Meanwhile, they also introduce a reference point to separate gain and loss situations.
Though many other utility functions are considered in the literature, only the globally risk-averse
(which includes risk-neutral) agent as well as a reference point will be discussed in this paper. The
reference point reflects the agent’s relative financial situation.
To incorporate both considerations, namely how risky an outcome is and how risk-averse the
agent is, we introduce a portfolio selection problem. This problem aims to find out a portfolio that
minimizes the duality risk measure of the utility of the relative investment outcome, that is the
difference between the investment outcome and the benchmark level. The risk measure addresses
the first consideration and the utility function the second. Since the duality risk measure is highly
nonlinear, we adopt a novel idea to deal with the portfolio selection problem, by firstly linking the
problem to a series of Merton’s optimum consumption-like problems, and then solving them using
the well-known Lagrange method. It turns out that the original problem is equivalent to one of the
series problems but with a particular choice of absolute risk aversion, which is given by an explicit
algebraic equation as a part of the explicit optimal solution. Thus the explicit solution of the original
problem is derived and the problem is completely solved. A critical threshold is also derived, so that
once the surplus level (that is, the difference between the benchmark level and initial endowment)
is beyond a threshold, the investment risk will exceed the agent’s risk tolerance. In particular, if the
agent is risk-neutral, that is to say with a linear utility function, then the investment risk will grow
linearly with respect to (w.r.t.) the surplus level. The investment risk is also positively related to
the entropy of the pricing kernel of the market. The result verifies the common financial intuition
that it is much harder and riskier to achieve the same surplus profit in a stable market than in a
less-stable market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the duality risk measure for all outcomes,
studies its properties and axiomatic characterization, and then shows that it is the unique nontrivial
index satisfying two axioms. Section 3 presents a portfolio selection problem under a complete
market setting. The problem is to find a possible outcome to minimize the duality risk measure of
the utility of the relative investment outcome. Section 4 is devoted to solving this portfolio selection
1S-shaped utility function is convex on the negative return and concave on the positive return.
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problem. We first study how well posed the problem is, that is, whether its value is finite. Then we
link it to a series of Merton’s optimum consumption-like problems via a bridge problem. The series
is then treated using the standard Lagrange method. Finally, the optimal solution and value of the
original problem are derived. Analytical and numerical examples are also presented in section 4 to
illustrate the main result of this paper. We conclude the paper in section 5.
2 Definition and Characterization of the Duality Index
In order to define the duality risk measure, we need to review some of the concepts used in Aumann
and Serrano (2008).
A gamble is a random variable whose mean is positive and that takes finitely many values, some
of which are negative.
Say that an agent with utility function u accepts a gamble g at wealth w2 if E[u(w+g)] > u(w),
where E stands for “expectation”; that is to say, the agent prefers taking that gamble to refusing it
at wealth w.3 Throughout this paper, we only consider the risk-averse (which includes risk-neutral)
agent; that is to say, u is concave.
Say that one agent is uniformly more risk-averse than another, if whenever the former accepts
a gamble at some wealth, the latter accepts that gamble at any wealth, but not vice versa.
A risk measure or index is a (positive) real-valued function on gambles. A gamble is less risky
than another under an index if its index value is strictly less than that of the latter.
Now we will introduce two important axioms related to indices.
Duality Axiom: If one agent, who is uniformly more risk-averse than another, accepts a gamble,
then the latter agent will accept any less-risky gamble under the index.
Positive Homogeneity Axiom: If a gamble is scaled by some positive scalar, then the index
value is also scaled by the same scalar.
Aumann and Serrano (2008) show that, up to a positive multiple, there is a unique index satisfying
the above two axioms. The duality axiom is more central than the other because together with
the weak conditions of continuity and monotonicity it already implies that the index is unique up
to the ordinal equivalent. Thus, we call the unique index satisfying both the duality and positive
homogeneity axioms the Aumann-Serrano Duality Risk Measure or Aumann-Serrano Duality Index,
or simply the Duality Risk Measure or Duality Index. Some important properties of the Duality
Index are listed as follows.
Sub-additive: The Duality Index of the sum of two gambles is no more than the sum of the indices
of each gamble.
Law-invariant : The Duality Indices of two identically distributed gambles are the same.
Convex : If a gamble is a linear combination of two gambles, then its Duality Index is no more
than the same combination of the indices of each gamble.
2Throughout this paper, wealth is constant.
3By this definition, no agent accepts 0, which is inconsistent with financial intuition that no loss is an acceptable
situation. In Aumann and Serrano (2008), it is not an issue because 0 is not regarded as a gamble. However, we will
regard 0 as an outcome in this paper, so we assume that all agents accept 0 throughout this paper. It would not
make any difference if 0 was assumed to be accepted by nobody.
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Monotonic: The Duality Index decreases monotonically w.r.t. the first- and second-order (stochas-
tic) dominance. 4
It is noted that the convexity property is not stated explicitly by Aumann and Serrano (2008),
however, this property will play a very important role in our analysis. It accords with the widely
accepted financial wisdom that diversified investment reduces risk.
Now, let us define the Duality Index for general outcomes.
2.1 New Definition of Duality Index
This paper is going to investigate a portfolio selection problem under the Duality Index. Portfolio
selection means finding the best possible outcome in a certain set under a certain meaning, in the
current setting, that is related to the Duality Index. Every outcome with a mean (which may not
be finite) will be considered. The definition of the Duality Index in Aumann and Serrano (2008)
cannot be employed, because the outcomes considered there only take finitely many values, and the
index is not well-defined for many of which need to be addressed here. The details will be stated
after Example 2.1 below. Therefore, it is necessary to extend the definition of Duality Index to
cover general outcomes.
Throughout this paper, the term market refers to a given probability space (Ω,F ,P), and
outcomes refer to random variables with well-defined finite or infinity mean values in the market.
Denote the set of all outcomes as
L=={X : X is a real-valued F-measurable random variable, E[X−] < +∞ or E[X+] < +∞},
where X− = max{−X, 0} and X+ = max{X, 0} stand for the loss part and gain part of an
outcome X, respectively, and E stands for the mathematical expectation on the given probability
space (Ω,F ,P).
Define the set of outcomes with finite moment generating functions on loss as
M=={X ∈ L : E[eεX− ] < +∞ for some scalar ε > 0}. (1)
It is clear that every moment of loss X− is finite when X ∈M and every lower bounded outcome
belongs to M. In particular, all the gambles considered in Aumann and Serrano (2008) belong to
M.
We first present several useful results.5
Lemma 2.1 Fix a scalar ε > 0. Then E[e−εX ] < +∞ if and only if E[eεX− ] < +∞.
Corollary 2.2 If E[e−εX ] < +∞ for some scalar ε > 0, then E[e−αX ] < +∞ whenever 0 6 α 6 ε.
Corollary 2.3 The set M can be expressed as
M = {X ∈ L : E[e−εX ] < +∞ for some scalar ε > 0} (2)
and
M = {X ∈ L : there is ε > 0 such that E[e−αX ] < +∞ whenever 0 6 α 6 ε }. (3)
Moreover, M is a convex set.
4Say that one gamble first-order dominates another one, if its value is always no less than the latter. Say that
one gamble second-order dominates another one, if the latter can be obtained by replacing some of the former’s value
with an outcome whose mean is that value. Say that one gamble stochastically dominates another one if there is a
gamble distributed like the former that dominates the latter. A gamble g second-order stochastic dominates another
gamble h if and only if E[f(g)] 6 E[f(h)] for all decreasing and convex utility functions f .
5Most of proofs in this paper are given in the Appendix.
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Each outcome is classified into one of the following categories:
A=={X ∈M : E[X+] > E[X−] > 0 },
B=={X ∈ L : E[X−] = 0 },
C=={X ∈ L : E[X−] > E[X+], E[X−] > 0 },
D=={X ∈ L : X /∈ A∪B∪C }.
Note that the set A∪B = {X ∈M : E[X] > 0 } ∪ {0} is convex. This simplifies our analysis.
Before formally defining the Duality Index, we need a very important lemma, Basic Lemma,
which will be used frequently in the following analysis.
Lemma 2.4 (Basic Lemma) Let αˆ = sup{α > 0 : E[e−αX ] 6 1} for each X ∈ L. Then the
mapping α 7→ E[e−αX ] is continuous on [0, αˆ] and E[e−αˆX ] 6 1. If P(X 6= 0) > 0, then E[e−αX ] < 1
whenever 0 < α < αˆ, and E[e−αX ] > 1 whenever α > αˆ. Moreover, 0 < αˆ < +∞ whenever X ∈ A,
αˆ = +∞ whenever X ∈ B, and αˆ = 0 whenever X ∈ C ∪D.
It is very important to notice that E[e−αˆX ] < 1 may happen in Basic Lemma.6
Example 2.1 Let X be a discrete outcome with distribution P(X = −n) = n−2e−3n−3 for each
positive integer n, P(X = 3) = 1 −∑∞n=1 n−2e−3n−3. Then X ∈ A, αˆ = 3, and E[e−αX ] < 1
whenever 0 < α 6 3 and E[e−αX ] = +∞ whenever α > 3.
It is not hard to prove that E[e−αˆX ] = 1 holds in Basic Lemma if and only if there is ε > 0 such
that 1 6 E[e−εX ] < +∞ (for example, X ∈ A is lower bounded). This allows Aumann and Serrano
(2008) to define the Duality Index as the unique positive root of E[e−X/R] = 1.7 However, as noted
above, E[e−X/R] = 1 may not admit a positive solution, so we have to change the definition of the
Duality Index.
Now, we define the Duality Index for every outcome in L.
Definition 2.1 Duality Index of X ∈ L is defined as αˆ−1, where αˆ = sup{α > 0 : E[e−αX ] 6 1}.8
This definition coincides with the original Duality Index presented for every outcome discussed in
Aumann and Serrano (2008). Denote by R(X) the Duality Index of X.
Let us look at the Duality Index for outcome in the different categories.
• If X ∈ A, then 0 < R(X) < +∞. The risk is moderate. Whether this outcome is accepted
by an agent depends on his/her risk tolerance.
• If X ∈ B, then αˆ = +∞ and R(X) = 0. There is no risk at all. It is consistent with financial
intuition. Any agent will accept this outcome because there is no potential loss.
• If X ∈ C, then αˆ = 0 and R(X) = +∞. The risk is intolerable. It is also in conformity
financial intuition because no risk-averse agent will accept this outcome.
• If X ∈ D, then αˆ = 0 and R(X) = +∞. This risk is also intolerable. Because D ⊆ {X ∈ L :
E[eεX
−
] = +∞ for every ε > 0 }, the loss is too large.
6In fact, E[e−αˆX ] may take any value between 0 and 1.
7When X is a gamble defined in Aumann and Serrano (2008), the equation E[e−X/R] = 1 admits a unique positive
root.
8Here 0−1 stands for +∞. If the definition of Duality Index is replaced by αˆ′−1, where αˆ′ = sup{α > 0 : E[e−αX ] <
1}. Then no agent would accept 0 since its Duality Index would be +∞. This would be consistent with the definition
of acceptable in Aumann and Serrano (2008). We think, however, it would contradict the financial intuition that no
loss is always an acceptable situation, so we do not adopt this definition.
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Therefore, it can be concluded thatR(X) is finite if and only if X belongs to A∪B.
Several essential properties of the Duality Index are listed as follows.
Proposition 2.5 The Duality Index has the following properties.
1. The Duality Index is subadditive: R(X + Y ) 6 R(X) +R(Y ) for any X,Y .
2. The Duality Index is positive homogeneous: R(kX) = kR(X) for any scalar k > 0 and X.
3. The Duality Index is convex.
4. The Duality Index is nonnegative and law-invariant.
5. The Duality Index is monotonically decreasing w.r.t. the first- and second-order (stochastic)
dominance.
2.2 Characterization and Uniqueness
In this section, we show that the Duality Index satisfies the duality and positive homogeneity axioms,
which is unique.
We need a technical result as follows. It shows that the Duality Index is continuous under the
meaning given below.
Lemma 2.6 Let u(·) be an increasing function and X ∈ L satisfy u(w + X) ∈ L at some wealth
w. Let Xn = min{max{X,−n}, n}. Then lim
n→+∞R(Xn) = R(X) and limn→+∞E[u(w + Xn)] =
E[u(w +X)].
Theorem 2.7 The Duality Index defined in Definition 2.1 is the unique, nontrivial, nonnegative
real-valued index on L that satisfies both the duality and positive homogeneity axioms.9
3 A Portfolio Selection Problem
Having introduced the Duality Index and studied its properties. We will consider a portfolio selection
problem under the Duality Index in this section.
An agent in the market is going to find an outcome X to
min
X
R(u(X − `)) s.t. E[ρX] = x, X ∈ L1, (4)
where the utility function u : R 7→ R of the agent is concave, strictly increasing, and differentiable
with u(0) = 0; the random variable ρ > 0 is the market price of risk or pricing kernel with mean
value 1; the constant ` is the benchmark or reference point of the agent,10 which is typically larger
than the initial endowment x; and the set of possible outcomes is defined as L1 =={X ∈ L : E[|X|] <
+∞}.
We assume that E[ρ ln(ρ)] < +∞ and E[ln(ρ)] > −∞.11 Note that E[ρ ln(ρ)] > E[ρ] ln(E[ρ]) =
0 and E[ln(ρ)] < ln(E[ρ]) = 0 by the Jensen’s inequality.12
9Say that a nonnegative real-valued index is nontrivial, the index of an outcome is zero if and only if the outcome
is accepted by all risk-averse agents. In fact, the latter means the outcome is nonnegative.
10For simplicity, we consider deterministic benchmark only. There is difficulty to generalize to random case.
11In the Black-Scholes, or Merton models, ρ is lognormal distributed. In this case, this assumption holds true.
12Throughout this paper, we assume ρ is not a constant if not elsewhere specified.
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The constraint E[ρX] = x is often called the budget constraint and limits the choice of a
particular hedging strategy as attainable or replicable given an initial endowment x. In this paper,
we assume the market is complete, that is to say, any outcome X ∈ L1 can be replicated. However,
we do not study here how to replicate an outcome. Interested readers can consult Pardoux and
Peng (1990) for an analysis of related topics.
It may be observed that people tend to think of possible outcomes relative to a benchmark
or reference point rather than the absolute outcomes themselves. This phenomenon is called the
framing effect. So we consider the relative outcome X − ` instead of the absolute outcome X in the
target. It turns out that the benchmark plays an essential role in the problem.
A risk-averse agent tends to derive less utility from consuming additional units of the same
product. This phenomenon is called the law of diminishing marginal utility and is reflected by the
concavity of the utility function in the target. If the agent is risk-neutral, then the utility function
is just the identical function, and we will discuss it as an example later.
4 Solving the Portfolio Selection Problem
Let Y = X − `. Then we can rewrite problem (4) as
inf
Y
R(u(Y )) s.t. E[ρY ] = −y, Y ∈ L1, (5)
where y = `−x is called the surplus level. We investigate this problem instead of problem (4). The
optimal value of problem (5) is defined as V (y). It is clear that V (y) = 0 whenever y 6 0 because
Y = −y > 0 is a feasible solution and R(u(Y )) = 0. In this case, the agent’s benchmark is too low,
so he/she can achieve it without any risk at all.
From now on, we focus on the case y > 0.
4.1 Well-posedness
Let us first study the well-posedness issue (whether or not the value is finite) of problem (5).
Proposition 4.1 The value of problem (5) is finite if and only if the set
Sy =={Y ∈ L1 : E[ρY ] = −y, u(Y ) ∈ A } (6)
is not empty. Moreover, if the value of problem (5) is finite, then the optimal solution, if it exists,
must belong to Sy.
Proof. “=⇒”: The value is finite, so there is Y ∈ L1 satisfying E[ρY ] = −y, u(Y ) ∈ A∪B. If
u(Y ) ∈ B, then Y > 0 a.s., E[ρY ] > 0 > −y, a contradiction. This also confirms that the set Sy is
not empty and the optimal solution, if it exists, must belong to Sy.
“⇐=”: This is evident. 
Now we study the set Sy. The condition u(Y ) ∈ A is not so easy to justify, so we want to find a
more easily justified replacement. Let us consider the following set
Sˆy =={Y ∈ L1 : E[ρY ] = −y, E[u(Y )] > 0 }. (7)
The set Sˆy is not so hard to analyze. It is related to the classic Merton’s optimum consumption
model (Merton 1971).
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Lemma 4.2 Define
yˆ== sup{y : there is Y ∈ L1 satisfying E[ρY ] = −y and E[u(Y )] > 0}. (8)
Then the set Sˆy is not empty if and only if y < yˆ.
It is clear that yˆ > 0 because whenever y < 0, Y = −y ∈ L1 satisfying E[ρY ] = −y and E[u(Y )] > 0.
The value of yˆ is not so hard to derive in general cases. Let us look at two most important and
widely used cases.
Example 4.1 If u(·) is linear, then yˆ = +∞.13
Example 4.2 If u(·) is strictly concave, then yˆ = − lim
λ→λˆ+
E
[
ρ(u′)−1
(
λρ
)]
, where
λˆ = sup
{
λ > 0 : E
[
u
(
(u′)−1
(
λρ
))]
> 0
}
. (9)
Next, we go back to study the set Sy.
Lemma 4.3 The set Sy is not empty if and only if y < yˆ.
Putting all of the results obtained thus far together, we can solve the well-posedness issue of problem
(5) completely.
Theorem 4.4 The value of problem (5) is finite if and only if y < yˆ, where yˆ is given by (8).
Moreover, when y < yˆ, the optimal solution of problem (5), if it exists, must belong to Sy, where
Sy is given by (6).
If y > yˆ or yˆ = 0, then the value of problem (5) and that of the original problem (4) are both infinity.
That is to say, if the benchmark level ` compared to the initial endowment x is too aggressive, then
the investment risk will be beyond any agent’s tolerance. By contrast, in the classic mean-variance
model, some agents may enter the market regardless of the benchmark level because the investment
risk will still be lower than his/her tolerance.
In the following part, we look for the optimal solution of problem (5). From now on, we assume
0 < y < yˆ.
4.2 Optimal Solution
The biggest difficulty in solving problem (5) is to overcome the nonlinearity of the Duality Index. To
overcome this, we introduce a series of problems and study their relationships. Eventually, we link
problem (5) to a solvable classic portfolio selection problem, and then deduce its optimal solution
and optimal value. It will be seen that Basic Lemma plays a key role in this approach.
Before introducing a new series of problems, we firstly need to analyze the value function of
problem (5).
Lemma 4.5 The value function V (·) of problem (5) is finite, increasing and convex on [0, yˆ).
By the convexity of the value function, we obtain that
Corollary 4.6 The value function V (·) is continuous on [0, yˆ).14
13Here we assume that essinf ρ = 0. For example, ρ is lognormal distributed. In general case, yˆ = 1/essinf ρ.
14In fact, V (·) is convex on (−∞, yˆ), so V (·) is continuous on (−∞, yˆ). In particular, V (0) = 0.
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From the above result, it can be seen that if the benchmark level ` is very close to the initial
endowment x, then the risk can be arbitrarily small. In other words, if an agent is not greedy, then
he/she can set a benchmark level which brings the investment risk within his/her level of tolerance
(no matter how small it is, provided it is not zero). That is to say, he/she will enter the market.
By contrast, in the classic mean-variance model without a risk-free asset, there is a so-called system
risk which is positive. If the system risk is beyond the agent’s risk tolerance, then no matter how
small the benchmark level is, he/she will not enter the market.
It is clear that the Duality Index which is the target of problem (5) is not easy to deal with. To
avoid this, we introduce a bridge problem
sup
(α,Y )
α s.t. E[e−αu(Y )] 6 1, E[ρY ] = −y, Y ∈ L1 . (10)
Our novel approach is based on the following result which suggests the relationships between the
above problem and problem (5).
Proposition 4.7 Fix y ∈ (0, yˆ). A pair (α∗, Y ∗) is an optimal solution to problem (10) if and only
if Y ∗ is an optimal solution to problem (5) and 0 < α∗ = 1/R(u(Y ∗)) < +∞.
The above result links problem (5) to problem (10). We now only need to consider the latter.
Problem (10) is significantly simpler than problem (5) since the Duality Index has been removed.
However, there are still two variables that need to be optimized in problem (10), and it may not be
easy to find the optimal solution directly because the feasible set may not be convex and the standard
Lagrange method cannot be applied directly. Our second novel idea is therefore to introduce a new
series of single-variable optimization problems which are easier to solve but still closely linked with
the bridge problem (10) and therefore also with problem (5).
Fix y ∈ (0, yˆ). Define a series of single-variable optimization problems parameterized by α > 0.
Pα : inf
Y
E[e−αu(Y )] s.t. E[ρY ] = −y, Y ∈ L1 . (11)
This is a Merton’s optimum consumption-like problem, in which the value of absolute risk aversion
α is given as a priori.
Denote the value of the above problem as VP(α) which is clearly nonnegative and finite, since
Y = −y is a feasible solution of it with a finite value. For the convenience of notation, VP(0) is
naturally defined as 1.
Before studying problem Pα, we need some preparations. For every α > 0, the mapping x 7→
e−αu(x) is strictly convex and decreasing on R, so its derivative x 7→ −αu′(x)e−αu(x) is a one to
one increasing mapping from R to (−∞, 0). Let Iα(·) denote the inverse of the mapping x 7→
−αu′(x)e−αu(x). Then Iα(·) is a one to one increasing mapping from (−∞, 0) to R.
Assumption 4.1 For each α > 0, ρIα (λρ) ∈ L1 and Iα (λρ) ∈ L1, whenever λ ∈ (−∞, 0).15
The behaviors of E[ρIα (λρ)] and E[Iα (λρ)] are very complicated. We refer interested readers to
Jin, Xu and Zhou (2008) for a complete study of a similar problem.
Example 4.3 If u(x) = x. Then Iα(x) = −α−1 ln(−α−1x). Assumption 4.1 is satisfied.
Now we turn to solve problem Pα. The complete solution is given below.
15This assumption may be replaced by a weaker one.
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Proposition 4.8 Fix y ∈ (0, yˆ). For each α > 0, problem Pα admits a unique solution
Yα = Iα (λρ) , (12)
where λ ∈ (−∞, 0) is the root of
E[ρIα (λρ)] = −y.
Moreover, the optimal value of problem Pα is given by VP(α) = E[e−αu(Yα)].
Although problem Pα is completely solved in the above proposition, its relationship to problem (10)
needs to be ascertained.
To answer this question, we need to study the properties of VP(·). The first one is the continuity
property of VP(·) which will be proved through its convexity.
Lemma 4.9 Fix y ∈ (0, yˆ). The value function VP(·) is convex on [0,∞) .
Corollary 4.10 The function VP(·) is nonnegative, finite and continuous on (0,∞).
The next result is dedicated to showing that the value function VP(·) is strictly less than 1 near 0.
Lemma 4.11 Fix y ∈ (0, yˆ). There is αˆ > 0 such that VP(α) < 1 whenever 0 < α < αˆ.
From the above lemma, VP(0+) 6 1 = VP(0). It is natural to ask whether VP(·) is continuous at
0. The answer is not true in general. This is very different from the answer to the value function
V (·) of problem (5). See the example in the following section.
We have the following important byproduct.
Corollary 4.12 The equation VP(α) = 1 admits at most one positive solution.
The following result shows that the value function VP(·) can be arbitrary large.
Lemma 4.13 For each α > 0, VP(α) > eαu
′(0)y−E[ρ ln(ρ)].
Since VP(α) is less than 1 when α is close to zero and bigger than 1 when α >
yu′(0)
E[ρ ln(ρ)] , so by the
concavity, we conclude that
Corollary 4.14 The equation VP(α) = 1 admits a unique positive solution.
Now we are ready to reveal the relationship between problem Pα and problem (10).
Proposition 4.15 Fix y ∈ (0, yˆ). Suppose VP(α∗) = 1 for some α∗ > 0. Let Y ∗ be the optimal
solution to problem Pα∗. Then the pair (α∗, Y ∗) is an optimal solution to problem (10).
Proof. Since VP(α∗) = 1, (α∗, Y ∗) is a feasible solution of problem (10). Suppose it is not optimal.
Then there is a pair (α, Y ) satisfying E[e−αu(Y )] 6 1, E[ρY ] = −y, Y ∈ L1, and α > α∗ > 0. This
Y is a feasible solution of problem Pα, so VP(α) 6 E[e−αu(Y )] 6 1. On the other hand, by the
convexity of VP(·),
1 = VP(α∗) 6
α− α∗
α
VP(0+) +
α∗
α
VP(α) 6
α− α∗
α
+
α∗
α
VP(α), 1 6 VP(α).
So VP(α) = 1. That VP(α) = VP(α∗) = 1 contradicts the claim of Corollary 4.12. 
Putting all of the results obtained thus far together, we obtain the complete solution of problem
(5).
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Theorem 4.16 Fix y ∈ (0, yˆ). Then VP(α) = E[e−αu(Yα)] = 1 admits a unique positive solution
α∗ > 0, where Yα is given by (12). Moreover, (α∗, Yα∗) is an optimal solution to problem (10), and
Yα∗ is an optimal solution to problem (5) with the optimal value 1/α∗, and 0 < α∗ 6 E[ρ ln(ρ)]yu′(0) .
The optimal value of problem (5) is lower bounded by yu
′(0)
E[ρ ln(ρ)] , which is increasing in y. Ac-
cording to Lemma 4.5, the bigger the surplus level, the higher the investment risk; the growth rate
by the above result is also at least u
′(0)
E[ρ ln(ρ)] . If the surplus level is too large, or to be more precise,
is larger than yˆ, then no risk-averse agent will enter the market.
4.3 Examples
In this section, we present two important examples to illustrate the main result of this paper.
Example 4.4 Risk-neutral agent. In this case, u(x) = x and yˆ = +∞.16 Then Iα(x) = − 1α ln(− xα).
The optimal solution to problem Pα is Iα(λρ) = −y + 1α(E[ρ ln(ρ)] − ln(ρ)) and optimal value is
VP(α) = E[e−αu(Iα(λρ))] = eαy−E[ρ ln(ρ)]. From VP(α∗) = 1, we obtain α∗ = E[ρ ln(ρ)]/y > 0. The
optimal solution to problem (5) is − ln(ρ)yE[ρ ln(ρ)] and the optimal value of problem (5) is V (y) = 1/α
∗ =
y
E[ρ ln(ρ)] , which is continuous on [0,∞). However, the value function VP(·) is not continuous at 0
since VP(0+) = e−E[ρ ln(ρ)] < 1 = VP(0). In this case, the investment risk is proportional to the
surplus level.
Example 4.5 Risk-averse agent. Let u(x) = 1−e−βx, β > 0 and ln(ρ) be normally distributed with
mean µ and variance σ2. Then we deduce µ = −12σ2 from E[ρ] = 1. It is not hard to derive yˆ = σ
2
2β .
In this case, Iα(·) is the unique function satisfying αe−βIα(x)−βIα(x) = α+ln(−x)−ln(α)−ln(β). Let
W (·) be the Lambert function, which is the unique function satisfying W (x)eW (x) = x on [0,+∞).
Then Iα(x) = 1β (W (−xβ eα)−ln(−xβ eα)+ln(α)). The following picture shows the relationship between
the risk and surplus level.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 Surplus Level
2
4
6
8
10
Duality Index
16Here we assume that essinf ρ = 0.
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Where σ2 = β = 1. From the picture, it can be seen that the risk will go to infinity as the surplus
level y goes to yˆ = σ
2
2β = 0.5, and to 0 as y to 0.
Remark 1 The more risk-averse (i.e., the bigger the β) the agent , the less (i.e., the smaller the
yˆ) his/her risk tolerance.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, a nontrivial, nonnegative, real-valued index for general outcomes is defined. It is a
generalization of the index introduced by Aumann and Serrano (2008). It retains many properties
of the original index including sub-additivity, law-invariance, convexity and monotonicity as well
as continuity. It is also the unique nontrivial index that satisfies both the duality and positive
homogeneity axioms.
A portfolio selection problem is then considered in a complete market setting. The problem is
completely solved by linking it to a series of Merton’s optimum consumption-like problems via a
bridge problem. The problem is equivalent to one of the series, which is revealed by an explicit
algebraic equation.
In an incomplete market setting, the problem will be much harder to tackle and a new method
needs to be adopted. Optimal stopping problem under the duality index is also interesting. These
problems will be addressed in the forthcoming papers.
Appendix
A Proof of Basic Lemma
By the monotonic convergence theorem, we have
lim
α→αˆ−
E[eαX
−
1{X<0}] = E[eαˆX
−
1{X<0}],
and by the dominated convergence theorem, we have
lim
α→αˆ−
E[e−αX
+
1{X>0}] = E[e−αˆX
+
1{X>0}].
Adding them up, noticing the definition of αˆ, we obtain
1 > lim inf
α→αˆ−
E[e−αX ] = E[e−αˆX ]. (13)
If P(X 6= 0) > 0, set f(α) = E[e−αX ]. Then f(·) on [0, αˆ] is a strictly convex function satisfying
f(0) = 1, f(αˆ) 6 1. Therefore, f(α) < αˆ−ααˆ f(0) +
α
αˆf(αˆ) 6 1, whenever 0 < α < αˆ. Since every
convex function is continuous in the interior of its domain, we obtain that f(·) is continuous on
(0, αˆ). By (13), we see that f(·) is continuous at αˆ too. By the definition of αˆ, we have that
E[e−αX ] > 1 whenever α > αˆ.
If X ∈ A, then αˆ > 0 by the definition of M. We also have that αˆ < +∞. Otherwise
E[e−αˆX ] > E[e+∞1{X<0}] = +∞.
If X ∈ B, then αˆ = +∞ by the definition.
Suppose αˆ > 0 for some X ∈ C. Then by the convexity of f(·), we have, for every α > 0,
f(α)−f(0)
α−0 > f ′(0+) = −E[X] > 0, which contradicts f(α) = E[e−αX ] < 1 whenever 0 < α < αˆ. We
conclude that αˆ = 0 for every X ∈ C.
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If X ∈ D, then E[X−] = +∞. So X /∈M since all the moments of X− are finite when X ∈M.
Therefore, E[e−αX ] = +∞ for all α > 0 and αˆ = 0 by the definition.
That f(·) is continuous at 0 whenever αˆ > 0 can be proved by the same idea as proving (13).
B Proof of Proposition 2.5
The proof is very similar to that in Aumann and Serrano (2008). However, our definition of the
Duality Index is different from the original one. So we give the proof here.
1. If one of X and Y belongs C ∪D, then R(X) +R(Y ) = +∞ > R(X +Y ) (which is defined as
+∞ whenever X +Y /∈ L). If one of X and Y belongs to B, say Y . Then X +Y > X almost
surely (a.s.). By the monotonic property which will be proved below, we have R(X + Y ) 6
R(X) = R(X) + R(Y ). Now suppose both X and Y belong to A. Let α1 = sup{α > 0 :
E[e−αX ] 6 1} and α2 = sup{α > 0 : E[e−αY ] 6 1}. Then 0 < α1, α2 < +∞. Set k = α2α1+α2 ∈
(0, 1). Then α1α2α1+α2 (X+Y ) = kα1X+(1−k)α2Y. By the convexity of the exponential function,
we have E[e−
α1α2
α1+α2
(X+Y )
] = E[e−kα1X−(1−k)α2Y ] 6 kE[e−α1X ] + (1− k)E[e−α2Y ] 6 1. By the
definition of the Duality Index, R(X + Y ) 6 α1+α2α1α2 = α
−1
1 + α
−1
2 = R(X) +R(Y ).
2. This follows immediately from the definition.
3. This follows from the above two properties.
4. This is evident.
5. Because the Duality Index is law-invariant, it is sufficient to prove the second-order case.
Suppose Y second-order stochastic dominates X. Then for each α > 0, the mapping x 7→ e−αx
is decreasing and convex, so E[e−αY ] 6 E[e−αX ]. Therefore, sup{α > 0 : E[e−αX ] 6 1} 6
sup{α > 0 : E[e−αY ] 6 1}. By the definition of the Duality Index, we have R(X) > R(Y ).
C Proof of Lemma 2.6
For each α > 0, by the monotonic convergence theorem, we have lim
n→+∞E[e
αX−n 1{X60}] = E[eαX
−
1{X60}]
and lim
n→+∞E[e
−αX+n 1{X>0}] = E[e−αX
+
1{X>0}]. Adding them up, we obtain that lim
n→+∞E[e
−αXn ] =
E[e−αX ]. This confirms that lim
n→+∞R(Xn) = R(X).
Similarly, by the monotonic convergence theorem, we have lim
n→+∞E[u(w+X
+
n )1{X>0}] = E[u(w+
X)1{X>0}] and lim
n→+∞E[u(w−X
−
n )1{X60}] = E[u(w+X)1{X60}]. Adding them up, we obtain that
lim
n→+∞E[u(w +Xn)] = E[u(w +X)].
D Proof of Theorem 2.7
Since the Duality Index defined in Definition 2.1 coincides with that in Aumann and Serrano (2008)
for all bounded outcomes, it also satisfies the duality axiom for all bounded outcomes.
Assume that the utility functions of two agents A and B are uA(·) and uB(·), respectively, and
the agent A is uniformly more risk-averse than agent B. Suppose that the agent A accepts an
outcome X ∈ L at some wealth w0, i.e., either X = 0 a.s. or E[uA(w0 +X)] > uA(w0). We need to
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prove that the agent B accepts any outcome Y ∈ L satisfying R(Y ) < R(X) at any wealth w, that
is to say, either Y = 0 a.s. or E[uB(w + Y )] > uB(w).
Since R(Y ) < R(X) 6 +∞, Y ∈ A∪B. If Y = 0, then it is accepted. If Y ∈ B−{0}, then
Y > 0 a.s., E[uB(w + Y )] > uB(w) and it is accepted too.
Now fix Y ∈ A and w ∈ R. Define Yε = Y − ε1{Y >0}, for every ε > 0. Then for each
α > 0 such that E[e−αY ] < 1, we have lim
ε→0+
E[e−αYε ] = E[e−αY ] < 1. So we conclude that
lim
ε→0+
R(Yε) 6 R(Y ) < R(X). Let us fix an ε > 0 such that R(Yε) < R(X).
LetXn = min{max{X,−n}, n} and Yn = min{max{Yε,−n}, n}. Then by Lemma 2.6, lim
n→+∞R(Yn) =
R(Yε) < R(X) = lim
n→+∞R(Xn). So R(Yn) < R(Xn) for every large n. On the other hand,
by Lemma 2.6, lim
n→+∞E[uA(w0 + Xn)] = E[uA(w0 + X)] > u(w0), so the agent A accepts Xn
at wealth w0 for every large n. Both Xn and Yn are bounded, so the agent B accepts Yn at
any wealth w, that is E[uB(w + Yn)] > uB(w) for every large n. Applying Lemma 2.6 again,
E[uB(w + Yε)] = lim
n→+∞E[uB(w + Yn)] > uB(w). Since Y ∈ A, P(Y > 0) > 0, E[uB(w + Y )] >
E[uB(w+Y −ε1{Y >0})] = E[uB(w+Yε)] > uB(w). That is to say, the agent B accepts Y at wealth
w. Now we proved that the Duality Index satisfies the duality axiom.
It is evident that the Duality Index satisfies the positive homogeneity axiom.
The uniqueness of the index can be proved by a similar limit argument. We leave the proof to
interested readers.
E Proof of Lemma 4.2
Suppose Sˆy is not empty, then there is Y ∈ L1 satisfying E[ρY ] = −y and E[u(Y )] > 0. Then for
any y′ < y, we have Y + y − y′ ∈ L1, E[ρ(Y + y − y′)] = −y′, and E[u(Y + y − y′)] > E[u(Y )] > 0.
This indicates that the set Sˆy′ is not empty. By the definition of yˆ, we conclude that the set Sˆy is
not empty whenever y < yˆ.
It is evident that the set Sˆy is empty whenever y > yˆ by the definition of yˆ.
We only need to prove that Sˆyˆ is empty whenever yˆ < +∞. Suppose not, then there is Y ∈ L1
satisfying E[ρY ] = −yˆ and E[u(Y )] > 0. Let Yε = Y − ε1{Y >0}. By the monotonic conver-
gence theorem, lim
ε→0+
E[u(Yε)1{Y >0}] = E[u(Y )1{Y >0}] > 0. It is evident that E[u(Yε)1{Y 60}] =
E[u(Y )1{Y 60}] > −∞ since E[u(Y )] > 0. Adding them up, we obtain lim
ε→0+
E[u(Yε)] = E[u(Y )] > 0.
Thus, there is ε > 0 such that E[u(Yε)] > 0. Set δ = εE[ρ1{Y >0}] > 0. If δ = 0, then Y 6 0 a.s.
and E[u(Y )] 6 0, a contradiction. So δ > 0. Since E[ρYε] = E[ρY ]− εE[ρ1{Y >0}] = −yˆ − δ < −yˆ,
we have that Yε ∈ Sˆyˆ+δ which contradicts the definition of yˆ. The proof is complete.
F Proof of Lemma 4.3
Suppose y < yˆ. Let ε > 0 such that y + ε < yˆ. Then by Lemma 4.2, Sˆy+ε is not empty, so
there is Y ∈ L1 satisfying E[ρY ] = −(y + ε) and E[u(Y )] > 0. Let Yn = max{Y,−n}. Since
Y 6 Yn 6 Y +, by the monotonic convergence theorem, lim
n→+∞E[ρYn] = E[ρY ] = −(y + ε) < −y
and lim
n→+∞E[u(Yn)] = E[u(Y )] > 0. Therefore, we have E[ρYn] < −y and E[u(Yn)] > 0 for large n.
Let δ > 0 satisfy E[ρ(Yn + δ)] = −y. It is very easy to verify that Yn + δ belongs to the set Sy. So
the set Sy is not empty.
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For every y > yˆ, by Lemma 4.2, Sˆy is empty. Because the set Sy is a subset of Sˆy, so it is
empty as well.
G Proof of Lemma 4.5
Let y1 < y2 < yˆ. For any two outcomes Y1, Y2 ∈ L1 satisfying E[ρY1] = −y1, E[ρY2] = −y2 and any
constant k ∈ (0, 1), by the concavity of u(·),
u(kY1 + (1− k)Y2) > ku(Y1) + (1− k)u(Y2).
Because the Duality Index is monotonically decreasing w.r.t. the first-order dominance and convex,
R(u(kY1 + (1− k)Y2)) 6 R(ku(Y1) + (1− k)u(Y2)) 6 kR(u(Y1)) + (1− k)R(u(Y2)),
which implies that
V (ky1 + (1− k)y2) 6 kV (y1) + (1− k)V (y2).
The monotonically increasing of V (·) is due to the fact that the Duality Index is monotonically
decreasing w.r.t. the first-order dominance. That V (·) is finite on [0, yˆ) is due to Theorem 4.4.
H Proof of Proposition 4.7
“=⇒”: We first prove that 0 < α∗ < +∞, then by the definition of the Duality Index, α∗ =
1/R(u(Y ∗)) follows immediately. Since y ∈ (0, yˆ), the set Sy is not empty, so there is Y ∈ L1
satisfying E[ρY ] = −y and u(Y ) ∈ A. Then 0 < R(u(Y )) < +∞. Since (1/R(u(Y )), Y ) is a
feasible solution of problem (10), α∗ > 1/R(u(Y )) > 0. On the other hand, if α∗ = +∞, then
1 > E[e−α∗u(Y ∗)] > +∞∗P(Y ∗ < 0), so P(Y ∗ < 0) = 0, E[ρY ∗] > 0 > −y, a contradiction.
Next we prove that Y ∗ is an optimal solution to problem (5). Otherwise, there is Y ∈ L1
satisfying E[ρY ] = −y and R(u(Y )) < R(u(Y ∗)). Then u(Y ) ∈ A∪B. Since u(Y ) ∈ B implies
that Y > 0 a.s. and E[ρY ] > 0 > −y, we conclude that u(Y ) ∈ A and so 0 < R(u(Y )) < +∞. Then
the pair (1/R(u(Y )), Y ) is a feasible solution of problem (10) and 1/R(u(Y )) > 1/R(u(Y ∗)) = α∗,
which contradicts the optimality of (α∗, Y ∗) to problem (10).
“⇐=”: Suppose Y ∗ is an optimal solution to problem (5). Since y ∈ (0, yˆ), the optimal value
R(u(Y ∗)) < +∞. Since R(u(Y ∗)) = 0 leads to Y ∗ > 0 a.s. and E[ρY ∗] > 0 > −y, a contradiction,
we conclude that 0 < R(u(Y ∗)) < +∞. Then (1/R(u(Y ∗)), Y ∗) is a feasible solution to problem
(10). Suppose it is not optimal. Then there is a pair (α, Y ) satisfying Y ∈ L1, E[e−αu(Y )] 6 1,
E[ρY ] = −y and α > 1/R(u(Y ∗)) > 0. Then Y is a feasible solution of problem (5), but R(u(Y )) 6
1/α < R(u(Y ∗)), which contradicts the optimality of Y ∗ to problem (5).
I Proof of Proposition 4.8
By the monotonic convergence theorem, the mapping λ 7→ E[ρIα (λρ)] is continuous and increasing
on (−∞, 0) and
lim
λ→−∞
E[ρIα (λρ)] = E[ lim
λ→−∞
ρIα (λρ)] = −∞,
lim
λ→0−
E[ρIα (λρ)] = E[ lim
λ→0−
ρIα (λρ)] = +∞,
so E[ρIα (λρ)] = −y admits a negative solution.
The optimality of (12) can be shown by the standard Lagrange method. We leave the proof to
interested readers.
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J Proof of Proposition Lemma 4.9
Let α > α′ > 0 be two scalars, and Y , Y ′ be the corresponding feasible solutions of problem Pα and
Pα′ , respectively. Then for any k ∈ (0, 1), by the convexity, monotonicity of exponential function,
and the concavity of u(·),
kE
[
e−αu(Y )
]
+ (1− k)E
[
e−α
′u(Y ′)
]
= E
[
ke−αu(Y ) + (1− k)e−α′u(Y ′)
]
> E
[
e−kαu(Y )−(1−k)α
′u(Y ′)
]
= E
[
e−(kα+(1−k)α
′)(βu(Y )+(1−β)u(Y ′))
]
> E
[
e−(kα+(1−k)α
′)(u(βY+(1−β)Y ′))
]
> VP(kα+ (1− k)α′),
where β = kαkα+(1−k)α′ ∈ (0, 1]. The convexity of VP(·) on [0,∞) is established.
K Proof of Lemma 4.11
By Proposition 4.1, Sy is not empty, so there is Y ∈ L1 satisfying E[ρY ] = −y, and u(Y ) ∈ A. By
Basic Lemma, there is αˆ > 0 such that VP(α) 6 E[e−αu(Y )] < 1 whenever 0 < α < αˆ.
L Proof of Corollary 4.12
Suppose that VP(α′) = VP(α′′) = 1 for some α′′ > α′ > 0. By the Lemma 4.11, there is 0 < α < α′
such that VP(α) < 1. By the convexity of VP(·), we deduce that
1 = VP(α′) 6
α′′ − α′
α′′ − α VP(α) +
α′ − α
α′′ − α VP(α
′′) < 1.
This confirms our claim.
M Proof of Lemma 4.13
We first consider the following problem
inf
Y
E[e−αu
′(0)Y ] s.t. E[ρY ] = −y.
The standard Lagrange method gives the optimal solution Y ∗ = −y+ 1αu′(0)(E[ρ ln(ρ)]− ln(ρ)), and
optimal value E[e−αu′(0)Y ∗ ] = eαu′(0)y−E[ρ ln(ρ)].
Because u(·) is concave and u(0) = 0, we have that u(x) 6 u′(0)x for all x ∈ R. Therefore, for
each α > 0 and Y ∈ L1 satisfying E[ρY ] = −y, we have
E[e−αu(Y )] > E[e−αu′(0)Y ] > E[e−αu′(0)Y ∗ ] = eαu′(0)y−E[ρ ln(ρ)].
The claim follows immediately.
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